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1 Introduction
The aging of the population and growing doubts about the sustainability of public pension systems have led
to several reforms, designed to increase the entitlement retirement age in most developed countries. The
success of such policies depends on how people respond to changes in their pension eligibility.
According to life cycle models (Seater, 1977 ; Bettendorf and Broer, 2003 ; Ljunqvist and Sargent, 2008 ;
Hairault et al., 2010), postponing the legal age of retirement should reduce the distance effect automatically,
thus producing a double dividend. That is, by extending the horizon to retirement age, this policy incites
workers to delay their retirement and then incites firms to keep and train older workers for longer.
In reality though, several factors may limit these effects. Cox and Jimenez (1990) demonstrate that the full
impact of programs for older workers can be assessed accurately only by taking the behaviors of all other
family members into consideration. According to the economics of the family (Chiappori, 1988, 1992, 1997
; Bourguignon et al., 1993, Alderman et al., 1995), no individual is a single decision maker, because inter-
actions always take place among various household members with different preferences. These interactions
seem particularly important between spouses, especially following the rise of female labor participation and
the growth of dual-earner families in developed countries. Interactions between spouses, reflecting both in-
come effects and leisure complementarities, suggest the possibility of spillover effects on the retirement
strategies of older workers (Hurd, 1990). Spouses likely time their retirement closely together, leading to
joint retirement trends among couples (Blau, 1998, Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000, 2014).
Omitting this family context could lead to overestimations of the impact of retirement eligibility rules on
retirement decisions (Hospido and Zamarro, 2014). For example, Li and O’Donoghue (2011) report that
in Ireland, increasing the minimum age for state pension entitlement from 65 to 70 years would delay
retirement by about 1.8 years, according to an individual-based model, but by only about 0.5 years if intra-
household interactions are considered. A better understanding of these retirement behaviors by couples thus
might provide better guidance for policy makers (van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2005 ; Blau and Gilleskie,
2006).
Despite growing literature that studies such joint retirement by spouses, no consensus is available regarding
the magnitude of this phenomenon, its determinants, or the potential gender-based asymmetry in retirement
behavior (Coile, 2004 ; Holtmann et al., 2006 ; Bingley and Lanot, 2007). Men and women respond differ-
ently to their household’s characteristics and environment (Blau, 1998 ; Stancanelli and Van Soest, 2012),
and determinants of joint retirement also depend on each country’s specific social security system (Gustman
and Steinmeier, 2004). For example, the basic pension scheme, or pension first pillar (Coile, 2015 ; Atalay
and Barrett, 2016), exerts a powerful effect. In Europe, three main types of first pillars coexist.
First, the Beveridgian welfare state bases pensions on taxes (mainly in Anglo-Saxon and some northern
European countries). Second, inspired by a Bismarck view, another first pillar defines earnings-related
pensions (e.g., continental Europe). Third, for a first pillar based on notional accounts (e.g., Sweden),
each individual invests some capital that gets converted, at retirement, into an annuity that depends on
the retirement age and life expectancy. Different first pillars imply different contributions of the insured.
Therefore, a particular pension scheme design might be particularly conducive to individualized decisions
or not and thereby affect joint retirement decisions. The basic pension in traditional Beveridgian models
is not contributive, which implies less individualized decisions. A basic pension could favor retirement if
the amount is sufficient (Banks et al., 2010). With their basis in insurance principles, Bismarckian systems
link contribution effort to benefits, which makes those pension schemes a bit more individualized, though
joint retirements still could occur, depending on the potential financial support for the couple by a working
spouse, which allows the first spouse to take an eligible pension (Stancanelli and Van Soest, 2012). Finally,
pension systems based on individual notional accounts clearly are designed to favor individual choices
(Selin, 2012).
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Regardless of which is the first pillar of a pension system, its operation can be disturbed by other areas
of the social system, such as the health care system or family policies. For example, older workers tend
to have higher expected medical expenditures (Kapur and Rogowski, 2007, Coe and Zamarro, 2011), so
good health policies can offer appropriate solutions if one spouse falls ill, including benefits to favor early
retirement or home-based care options.
In this context, this article seeks to analyze the joint retirement process for couples in a multi-country set-
ting. We test not only if joint retirement exists, after accounting for all other factors that might explain
retirement decisions, but also whether the potential for joint retirement differs according to the rules im-
posed by distinct social security systems and pension schemes.
To do so, we turn to the SHARE survey 1 which describes couples and their retirement decisions across sev-
eral countries. We focus attention on three: Denmark, France, and Sweden. These countries present some
similarities but also distinct social security systems, which makes the comparison of households’ behaviors
in these three countries relevant for testing the joint retirement hypothesis. For example, Denmark, France,
and Sweden all score relatively high on gender equality, compared with other European countries (Mills et
al., 2014a ; Mills et al., 2014b). They all reach the Lisbon target in terms of female employment rate (60%)
and have relatively more equal earnings structures than other European countries. On the social policy side,
Denmark, France, and Sweden also have embraced relatively equilateral and generous approaches. Finally,
all three countries have adopted a pay-as-you-go pension system. Yet we also observe key differences in
the first pillar. The Danish pension system is based on a basic pension, financed by general tax revenues
and reduced for high income earners. Denmark thus seems to adopt a Beveridge view. French retirees
instead receive an earning-related public pension, complemented by a compulsory occupational pension,
offering a good example of the Bismarck tradition. Finally, Sweden represents an alternative scheme, in
that it implemented notional accounts in 1998. Moreover, in all three countries, the health care systems are
relatively generous, yet differences with regard to allowances for taking care of ill relatives are notable.
To test for joint retirement by spouses in these different institutional contexts, we estimate bivariate probit
models for each country. As explanatory variables, we include the age difference between spouses, house-
hold outcomes and composition, and two variables that act on both spouses’ decisions: distance to legal
retirement age and health indicators. We find strong interactions by couples in their retirement decisions,
whatever the country. However, the determinants of joint retirement differ across countries, due to institu-
tional differences.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next section precises the theoretical framework of joint
retirement into couples. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical analysis and section 4 concludes.
2 Joint retirement by couples: a brief review
Retirement decisions often get analyzed as an individual trade-off between the costs and benefits of re-
tirement versus remaining in employment, without considering how family dimensions might affect such
decisions. This purely individual view, as manifested in life cycle models (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954
; Merton, 1971), is challenged by theory regarding the economics of the family (Chiappori, 1988, 1992,
1997 ; Bourguignon et al., 1993, Bourguignon et al., 2009 ; Browning, 2000 ; Browning and Gortz, 2012),
which shows that most decisions take place at a collective level within households, depending on the charac-
1This paper uses data from SHARE Waves 5 (DOIs: 10.6103/SHARE.w5.500), for methodological details, see Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2013 Borsch-Supan et al. (2013), 2015 Borsch-Supan et al. (2015))and
Malter and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2015 Malter and Borsch-Supan (2015)). The SHARE data collection was funded primarily by the European Commission through FP5 (QLK6 − CT − 2001 − 00360), FP6
(SHARE − I3 : RII − CT − 2006 − 062193, COMPARE : CIT5 − CT − 2005 − 028857, SHARELIFE : CIT4 − CT − 2006 − 028812) and
FP7 (SHARE − PREP : N211909, SHARE − LEAP : N227822, SHAREM4 : N261982). Additional funding from the German Ministry of Education and Research, the
U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01AG09740− 13S2, P01AG005842, P01AG08291, P30AG12815, R21AG025169, Y 1−AG− 4553− 01, IAGBSR06−
11, OGHA04 − 064) and from various national funding sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org)
3
teristics and bargaining power of each spouse. The economics of the family thus fills an important literature
gap, revealing that retirement decisions depend on the collaboration among household members, who have
different preferences. By collaborating, households’ members can allocate their time, between remaining
at work and retiring. In this conceptual framework, three main sources lead to retirement coordination by
couples (Hurd, 1990).
First, due to their similar preferences, spouses may value retirement planning similarly. According to Goux
and Maurin (2003), people tend to marry partners with similar socio-economic characteristics and personal
preferences. Such marital homogamy could create positive assortative mating trends (Mascie-Taylor and
Vandenberg, 1988) and lead to favor joint retirement.
Second, joint retirement can be linked to leisure complementarities between spouses, which occur if both
spouses value their partner’s presence and want to spend their leisure time together (Hurd, 1990). Each
spouse’s utility thus depends on the partner’s status, which influences the trade-off between the cost and
expected benefits of all household members (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000 ; Michaud and Vermeulen,
2010). This leisure complementarity between spouses also could lead to retirement coordination, to maxi-
mize individual utility in the form of shared time.
Third, a retirement decision may depend on financial incentives, such as public retirement or health policies.
A change in these incentives could generate a common shock on the household’s budget and the bargaining
power of each spouse (Chiappori, 1988, 1992, 1997 ; Bourguignon et al., 1993 ; Manski, 1993 ; Dahl et al.,
2010). Thus, it may influence the efficient allocation of resources and create cross-spouse incentives (Hurd,
1990 ; Coile, 2004).
Together, these three mechanisms should lead to a positive correlation of the retirement dates of couples
(Becker, 1973 ; Hurd, 1990 ; Manski, 1993), as is confirmed in several empirical studies (Hurd, 1990 ;
Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000). Recently, Hospido and Zamarro (2014) find that the probability of women
leaving the labor force increases by 16–18 percentage points when their husbands also stop working; a sim-
ilar but less precise effect arises for men. They also estimate that controlling for spouses’ working status
reduces the impact of one’s own eligibility for retirement pensions on the probability of leaving the labor
force by 3 or 4 percentage points for early retirement and by 6 or 3 percentage points for full retirement
pensions for men and women, respectively.
But extant empirical literature does not explain why such joint retirement exists and what mechanisms
cause it. Empirical studies confront a major difficulty, due to the strong asymmetrical behaviors that appear
within couples. For example, Stancanelli and Van Soest (2012) study leisure complementary and conclude
that a husband’s retirement does not increase the joint leisure hours of the couple, but the retirement of the
wife significantly does. Traditional gender roles within households might explain why the determinants of
retirement timing differ for each spouse(Talaga and Beehr, 1995 ; Dentinger and Clarkberg, 2002 ; Pozzoli
and Ranzani, 2009). In settings marked by traditional roles, men provide financial support for the house-
hold, whereas women offer more psychological or physical assistance. In this framework, men’s retirement
decisions exert a greater influence on women’s decisions, and the influence is even stronger if a spouse suf-
fers health problems (Johnson and Favreault, 2001 ; Van Rijn et al., 2014). Dentinger and Clarkberg (2002)
show, using U.S. data, that wives caring for their husbands are five times more likely to retire than women
who are not caregivers, whereas husbands caring for their wives are substantially slower to retire. However,
the prevalence of this caregiver role for women is decreasing. Because their careers in labor markets of-
ten are incomplete, women have fewer pension opportunities (O’Rand and Henretta, 1982 ; Aliaga, 2005).
Most women marry older men, so wives would retire at a younger age than their husbands if they coordi-
nated their retirement timing (Ruhm, 1996). In this sense, joint retirement could be a very costly option for
women. In the United States, Johnson and Favreault (2001) report that household members are less likely
to retire if their spouse leaves the labor force because of health problems, especially if that spouse is not
yet eligible for Social Security retirement benefits. Finally, because women face more financial constraints
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than men, spouses perceive financial retirement incentives in asymmetrical ways, related to their partner
situation (Blau, 1998 ; Coile, 2004). The retirement incentives of each spouse affect their own retirement
decisions and their spouses. If men seem sensitive to spillover effects from their spouses (Coile, 2004), the
same might not be true of women. Instead, women appear influenced more by their own economic variables
when making retirement decisions, not merely following their husbands (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000 ;
Coile, 2004). According to Bloemen et al. (2015), wives respond to husbands’ choices at ages when they
are likely eligible for early retirement programs. Only social systems limiting the financial constraints of
women can encourage joint retirement in this case.
As this literature reveals, joint retirement clearly exists among couples, but gender asymmetries in behaviors
and the impact of institutional systems and incentives make it difficult to identify the specific determinants
of this coordination. By exploiting data from an European survey, we attempt to overcome this theoretical
gap with a multi-country study.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We use the last wave (Wave 5, 2013) of the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE),
which includes people belonging to households with at least one member who is 50 years of age or older.
For several reasons, SHARE is well-suited to assess elder couples’ behaviors across countries. First, the
cross-national panel database includes 20 European countries. Second, it provides information about cou-
ples, by matching each respondent with his or her partner. Third, SHARE indicates the economic situation
of the respondents, their health status, and some sociological data. To account for the impact of the institu-
tional context, we conduct a multi-country analysis of Denmark, France, and Sweden. As noted previously,
these countries feature some social similarities, such as gender equality in employment, achieved through
reforms that were designed to decrease disincentives to female labor force participation. In 2010, all three
countries nearly reached the Barcelona targets2 in terms of childcare indicators, making them European
leaders when it comes to these social politics (Mills et al., 2014a). Furthermore, they all have reached the
Lisbon target in terms of female employment rate (60%), with relatively higher female labor force partici-
pation rates than other European countries: 76% in Denmark, 67% in France, and 79% in Sweden, versus
62% on average in OECD countries (2014 data). Denmark, France, and Sweden also feature relatively more
equal earnings structures across couples than other European countries. According to Mills et al. (2014b),
the shares of male sole provider households in these three countries are among the lowest in Europe (7% in
Denmark, 12% in France, and 8% in Sweden, compared with 21% in UE27 in 2010). The share of relatively
equal earnings structures accordingly is higher too: 43% in Denmark, 36% in France, and 35% in Sweden,
compared with 28% in UE27 (2010 data).
On the social policy side, Denmark, France, and Sweden also have adopted relatively equilateral, generous
systems compared with other developed countries. For their pension systems, all three countries rely on
pay-as-you-go systems. However, institutional differences may influence retirement decisions. For exam-
ple, the Danish pension system includes a public basic scheme, complemented by individual contributions.
A compulsory occupational scheme, negotiated as part of collective agreements, also complements the base
pension. The French retirement system primarily reflects a state pension scheme, depending on the sector
of activity. The state pension is calculated on the basis of the personal wage, rate of contribution, and
length of contribution. Mandatory supplementary schemes also complement this general state regime. In
Denmark and France, recent reforms moved the legal retirement age. Specifically, Denmark’s 2011 pension
2The Barcelona targets, defined in March 2002, recommend providing childcare to encourage gender equality and promote female
labor participation. The specific targets for 2010 were to provide childcare to at least 90% of children between 3 years of age and the
mandatory school age, as well as to at least 33% of children younger than 3 years.
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reform postponed the legal retirement at 67 years for those born after June 1960. In France, with its 2010
pension reform, the legal retirement age became 62 for people born after 1955, compared with 60 before
(The Appendix contains the reform agendas in France and Denmark). In contrast, the Swedish pension
system is based on defined contribution schemes, such that individual contributions get virtually capitalized
in accounts that earn a notional rate of return, set by the government. Since 1994, Swedish people have
been authorized to retire at the age of 61 years.
Finally, all three countries have generous health care systems, which is important for studies of elderly citi-
zens, and they offer benefits to take care of ill relatives. But again, some differences emerge. In Denmark,
the care allowance represents almost 50% of men’s wages and 60% of women’s earnings. In France, the
health system grants family solidarity leave and an allowance of 55 euros per day, nearly the French mini-
mum wage. Additional allowances may be added, such as pensions for disabled adults. Sweden’s scheme
is the most generous, in that municipalities compensate family caregivers directly by employing them, for
an allowance of nearly 30 euros per hour of work, higher than the hourly median wage of just less than 20
euros.
In each country, we select a sample of married couples living together who both responded to the survey.
Due to our focus on spouses’ choices to remain at work or retire, we exclude inactive, unemployed, and
disabled respondents. We thus gather information about 1008 couples in Denmark, representing 48.8% of
the original Danish sample; 902 French couples, or 40.6% of the initial French sample; and 1071 Swedish
households, corresponding to 42.3% of the sample. Tables 1 details some household and individual charac-
teristics, respectively.
Our key variables pertain to the activity status of each partner in the household. Let ymi and y
w
i define the
status of men (m) and women (w) in a given household i. These binary variables are equal to 1 when an
individual j (where j = m,w), in couple i is retired and 0 if employed. Descriptive statistics (see the Ap-
pendix) reveal some country differences. In the Danish sample for example, 52% of respondents are retired,
but 66% are in Sweden and 70% are in France. The proportion of retirees thus appears lower in Denmark,
which might reflect the age composition of the respondents. People younger than 60 years represent 37.5%
of the Danish sample, versus 26.5% in France and 19.5% in Sweden.
More interesting are the statistics by gender. The retirement ages of men and women are similar in all three
countries, though women appear to be three years younger than their spouses on average (Table 1). But the
age difference at retirement is less than two years, and more than 15% of couples exit the labor force the
same year. This finding suggests coordination in spouses’ retirement timing, as well as that women retire
younger.
[TABLE 1]
To add nuance to this finding, we also analyze of retirement age density by gender in each country
(Figure 1).
[FIGURE 1]
According to these findings, the coordination of retirement decisions is particularly evident in Denmark,
but less so in France or Sweden. Institutional differences could explain these findings. That is, in Denmark,
the retirement age distributions of men and women differ, with a peak around 60 years (i.e., before the
legal retirement age of 65 years), yet this peak is much more pronounced for women. Danish women
thus seem to retire earlier than men, which may indicate joint retirement by couples and perhaps women’s
tendency to assume caregiving roles through early retirement. Bingley et al. (2004) similarly show that
several Danish institutional schemes allow for early retirement (e.g., public employment pension, post-
employment wage pension), without strong financial sanctions. In France, the retirement age distributions
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indicate a peak around the legal retirement age of 60 years, but more women (than men) wait to reach 65
years, and thus the full rate pension, to withdraw. Women tend to have more discontinuous careers, so
French women might be incited to remain at work to maximize their financial retirement planning (Aliaga,
2005). Financial constraints seemingly exert a strong influence on retirement decisions in France. Finally,
in Sweden, a larger portion of women (than men) tends to retire between 62 and 65 years, signaling potential
joint retirement. But retirement age distributions are centered around 65 years, for both men and women.
This finding aligns with the Swedish pension system, that is, an individualized contributory system based
on notional accounts, such that it favors individual behaviors.
These influential institutional differences motivate our multi-country analysis. To identify potential joint
decisions, we estimate three (one for each country) bivariate probit models (Heckman, 1978), in which
we analyze the husband’s and wife’s probabilities of being retired (yji with j = m,w) simultaneously,
according to individual, spouse, household, and institutional variables. Specifically,{
Prob(ymi = 1) = β
′
mX
m
i + δmZi + λmT
w
i + 
m
i
Prob(ywi = 1) = β
′
wX
w
i + δwZi + λwT
m
i + 
w
i
(1)
Where :
• m, w and i indexe respectively men, women and couples ;
• Xji includes individual attributes at the time of the interview ;
• Zji contains household’s characteristics ;
• Tmi is a vector of partner’ attributes ;
• mi and 
m
i are errors terms supposed to be drown from a bivariate normal distribution with:
Cov[mi , 
w
i | xmi , xwi ] = ρ
The coefficient ρ reflects the correlation between spouses’ retirement decisions within the couple, to
capture the potential spillover effect (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000 ; Coile, 2004 ; Li and O’Donoghue,
2011).
With regard to the observed variables included to explain retirement decisions (vectors Xji and T
j
i ), we
include education to capture the effects of human capital, which proxies for income and consequently the
bargaining power of spouses within the household. This variable is based on the International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED 1997) from UNESCO, with three categories: low (none, preprimary,
and primary education), medium (lower secondary/secondary), and high (tertiary) education. We also in-
troduce a health indicator, because health problems have direct effects on retirement decisions and on the
spouse’s decision, according to who takes the caregiver role. We choose an objective health indicator,
namely, the number of chronic diseases (e.g., diabetes, hypertension, arthritis). Finally, we estimate sepa-
rate equations for each country to capture institutional differences, but we also account for the institutional
context from an individual perspective, which likely has a strong impact on retirement decisions, according
to both life cycle models and Figure 1. That is, as an explanatory variable, we include the (time) distance
to the legal age of retirement, calculated according to the legal rules in each country, and equal to 0 if the
person is already retired. The SHARE data set provides the dates of the interview and the respondent’s
birth, so we can calculate this distance Dji precisely, using individual i’s birth month and year:
Dji = legal age of retirement
j
i − ageji (2)
In addition to individual variables, we consider household attributes (Zji ) as explanatory factors. In par-
ticular, the age difference between spouses could act as a barrier to the joint retirement process, especially
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when it comes to pension rights. A household budget constraint also is included, according to the house-
hold’s gross financial assets per capita. Finally, we take intergenerational ties into account. Older workers
generally are not concerned with the presence of dependent children, but we introduce the presence of
grandchildren as a potentially pertinent factor.
To robustly identify our results, we estimate conditional odds ratios to compare the impact of some key
explanatory variables on retirement estimated probabilities. This allows us to test the significant difference
between spouses’ behaviors.
4 Results
The results from the bivariate probit models are in Table 2. Each column presents the results for Denmark,
France, and Sweden. The robustness of the findings is affirmed by the correct prediction rates, which are
greater than 80% for all three countries. The marginal effects and conditional odds ratios are in the Ap-
pendix.
To compare the results from the three countries, we begin with how individual characteristics affect retire-
ment decisions (Xji ). Human capital has a role, especially in Sweden (both men and women) and France
(men only). The most educated are less likely to retire, probably because they have more employment op-
portunities. We also find a significant distance effect, such that retirement decisions depend on the person’s
own distance to the legal retirement age: The shorter the distance, the higher the retirement probability.
Thus, postponing the legal retirement age should incite people to delay their retirement. However, this
reform also could affect spouses in some countries. Health influences retirement decisions too, such that
people suffering from chronic diseases are more likely to retire, due to their strong labor disutility or need
for care. Moreover, health sometimes interacts with the distance effect, especially for women. The effects
of this interaction differ according to the country studied though, so they may be linked to institutional
differences in social care systems.
[TABLE 2]
But the major result of our study is to highlight that retirement decisions depend not only on individual
attributes but also on household characteristics (Zji ).
In turn, we note that household gross financial assets can influence individual retirement decisions, though
not in all countries. We find a significant, negative effect of this characteristic in Denmark (men and women)
and Sweden (men only), but not in France. In the two first countries, some of the pension system is based on
individual contributions, so remaining employed could increase these contributions, especially if the house-
hold has substantial assets. But in France, where the system is based on public pensions and mandatory
occupational schemes, household gross financial assets are not significant for either spouse. Our results are
in line with Blanchet and Debrand (2007) : Depending on the pension system, the scale of pension rights is
a major determinant of retirement planning.
Having grand-children seems to exert a weak effect (cf. Denmark), but retirement decisions depend strongly
on the spouse’s status and attributes. In all three countries, we note the strong correlation of retirement
choices between spouses. The error terms for the spouses’ equations are significantly and positively corre-
lated (ρ > 0), indicating the presence of common unobservable preferences and a joint retirement process
by couples (Hurd, 1990).
In all countries, but particularly in Sweden, the pension system is more individualized, but the spouse’s situ-
ation directly affects both men’s and women’s retirement decisions. Thus, both observable spouse attributes
and unobservable member preferences influence retirement choices, despite the strong country heterogene-
ity.
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Delving deeper into this interesting finding, we consider the spouse’s attributes that may influence individ-
ual retirement decisions (T ji ), To start, for health status, we observe vast differences by gender but also
across the three countries. In Denmark, a traditional role framework seems to apply, such that women
adopt caregiver roles, and the probability that both spouses are retired increases by 3.6% when the husband
suffers from poor health (see the marginal effects in the Appendix). The husband’s probability of being
retired instead decreases significantly when his ill wife is farther from her legal retirement age, suggesting
that men provide financial support for the household. In France, and in contrast with Denmark, men assume
a caregiver role. The probability of both spouses being retired increases by 11.2% when the wife has poor
health; the husband’s health is not significant. Finally, in Sweden, a spouse’s poor health is a significant,
positive determinant of retirement for both men and women. The probability of both spouses being retired
increases by 2.7% and 7.1%, respectively, when the husband or wife is in poor health. Women’s health
status has a stronger impact on the probably of joint retirement. Finally, husbands average three years older
than their wives, suggesting a greater probability that men are closer to their own legal age of retirement.
Thus retirement may be more likely when his wife experiences serious health troubles.
Those results are confirmed by conditional odds ratios, expected for Denmark where there is not significant
difference between spouses’ responses to the health of the partner3.
Country differences in the estimated impacts of spouses’ health can be attributed to differences in the health
care system. The generosity of the Swedish health care system allows both husbands and wives to display
altruistic behaviors. If one spouse becomes ill, the public allowance compensates for the financial losses for
the caregiver. In Denmark and France, the existing financial incentives seem insufficient to encourage al-
truistic behaviors. Because women face more financial constraints than men, they appear unable to respond
to those incentives.
The legal retirement age also influences partners’ decisions. In Denmark and France, we find strong gender
asymmetry when it comes to the distance to retirement. In Denmark, a higher distance to the legal age of
retirement for the wife decreases the probability that her husband is retired. Even though women tend to
marry older men, husbands seemingly wait for their wives, to achieve joint retirement. When both spouses
are retired, the marginal effect of the wife’s distance is twice that of her husband’s. Along similar lines, in
France, the distance of the wife to retirement significantly decreases the probability that the husband is re-
tired; the reverse is not significant. Women experience serious constraints on their access to pension rights,
which induces these asymmetrical spousal spillover effects. In this sense, women appear influenced mainly
by their own economic features when making retirement decisions. The distance of the wife decreases the
probability of being simultaneously retired by 1%. However, conditional odds ratios does not support the
significant difference between spouses’ behaviors because the magnitude of the effects for both spouses are
too close.
Here again, Sweden is distinct, revealing no such asymmetry. The probability of both spouses being retired
decreases with distance to the legal age of retirement of the spouse: 2.5% for the distance of the husband
and 1.5% for the wife. Joint behaviors are dominant among Swedish couples. Public family policy appears
to encourage this choice, thereby counteracting the individualized pension system. For example, one spouse
may choose to transfer funded pension rights to the other, to facilitate early retirement for the younger part-
ner. Thus joint retirement can be made easily accessible through a policy that complements pension rights
systems.
3This only capture the own effect of the health variable and not the cross effect with the distance to the legal age.
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5 Conclusion
This article tests predictions of joint retirement by couples in a multi-country setting. Using SHARE data
from Denmark, France, and Sweden — three countries with relatively equilateral and generous public, so-
cial, and retirement systems — we confirm the existence of a joint retirement process by couples, due to
both observed and unobserved variables. Thus research must account for the family environment in indi-
vidual retirement decisions, as recommended by the economics of family (Chiappori, 1992 ; Bourguignon
et al., 1993).
We also highlight some strong asymmetries by gender, mainly related to institutional differences in social
security systems. Men and women respond differently to incentives, according to each country’s social sys-
tem. Retirement rules influence spouses’ decisions, but so do the rules of the health care system. Finally,
when the social system seeks to incite spouses to be altruistic by giving a generous allowance to caregivers,
both men and women coordinate their retirement timing. If public subsidies instead are low, only the spouse
with lower financial constraints can anticipate retirement. Then, particularly for women in France, individ-
ual economic motivations dominate, and retirement occurs only upon the legal retirement age, and even for
spouses who would prefer to retire together.
Our work thus suggests two key conclusions. First, retirement decisions must be viewed as a result of a
collective decision process by couples. Neglecting this status could bias evaluations of the impact of public
policies, with strong negative effects for people who are highly sensitive to these policies. Second, both
pension rules and the health care system matter. An individualized pension system combined with a gen-
erous caregiver allowance (e.g., Sweden) can grant incentives to remain employed, exhibit altruism, and
reduce the financial constraints faced by women. In contrast, a pay-as-you-go system (as in Denmark or
even more so in France) could reinforce inequalities in couples, especially if any health problems occurs.
Our results thus argue for the inclusion of the family dimension in defining social policies and coordinating
these policies.
10
Table 1: Average age and average age of retirement
Countries Denmark France Sweden
VARIABLES Men Women Men Women Men Women
Average age 65.81 63.22 67.63 65.03 69.45 66.74
Observations 1008 1008 902 902 1071 1071
Average age of retirement 62.48 61.07 58.86 59.66 63.27 62.74
Observations 532 519 675 599 742 692
Source : SHARE Survey, 2013
Figure 1: Density of the retirement age by country
Source : SHARE Survey, 2013
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Table 10: Conditional odds ratios
Prob(ywi = 1)|Healthmi
Prob(ymi = 1)|Healthwi
Prob(ymi = 1)|Healthwi
Prob(ywi = 1)|Healthmi
Denmark 1.066 0.937
(0.116) (0.102)
France 0.872 1.146
(0.066)* (0.087)*
Sweden 0.863 1.158
(0.055)** (0.073)**
Prob(ywi = 1)|Dmi
Prob(ymi = 1)|Dwi
Prob(ymi = 1)|Dwi
Prob(ywi = 1)|Dmi
Denmark 1.009 0.990
(0.005)** (0.005)**
France 1.006 0.993
(0.005) (0.005)
Sweden 0.975 1.024
(0.012)* (0.013)*
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source : SHARE Survey, 2013
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